一、题 目:The Pricing Strategies and the Default Patterns of Unsecured Consumer Loan
二、主讲人：路磊
三、时 间：2019年07月4日（周四）下午14:30-15:30
四、地 点：A4-305(学术报告厅)
报告摘要：This paper explores the dynamic pricing strategies of an unsecured consumer loan issuer and the default patterns of the loans. We examine a unique proprietary data set of about 3 million unsecured consumer loans from a representative sample of households provided by a Business-to-Consumer (B2C) online retailer in China. First, the likelihood of a customer being solicited by the loan issuer increases monotonically in credit worthiness and age. Second, the pricing strategies of the loan issuer demonstrate a trade-off across the borrowers. The unsecured consumer loan lender reduces the credit supply for the non-solicited more risky borrowers, and charges less for these borrowers. After the passage of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) Act (the CBRC Act), this trade-off is exacerbated. Third, the consumer loan default probability, arrears amount, and the time in arrears are lower for solicited customers, higher for more risky borrowers, higher for younger borrowers, and higher after the passage of the Act.
报告人简介：路磊，加拿大曼尼托巴大学阿斯博商学院 Bryce Douglas金融学讲席教授，博士生导师, 研究生项目主任。他于2007年毕业于加拿大麦吉尔大学，获得金融学博士学位。2007-2011年任教于上海财经大学金融学院， 2011-2016年任教于北京大学光华管88858cc永利官网。他的研究方向包括资产定价和行为金融。他的研究成果发表在Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，Management Science, Journal of Futures Markets, Economic Theory, Economics Letters 等英文期刊；他的研究也发表在《管理科学学报》和《金融研究》等中文期刊。他曾经主持过国家自然科学基金面上项目，上海市浦江人才计划项目，以及中国金融期货交易所的研究项目。
